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1 INTRODUCTION 
Research into technological support in disaster and other emergency situations has 
become increasingly common. One aspect of this burgeoning research agenda has been 
investigation into the role that mobile devices might play. However, the availability of 
networks is a recognized problem in such situations. It can take hours, sometimes 
weeks, in the aftermath of a disaster for the mobile network to be fully restored (Al-
Akkad et al., 2013; Jennex, 2012; Palen and Liu, 2007; Sutton, 2012), leaving people 
in what has been termed an information vacuum (Sutton, 2012).  
Some studies have focused specifically on the use of remnants of technology in the 
aftermath of disasters. For example, researchers have analyzed how people leverage 
information and communication technology (ICT) in war zones (Mark & Semaan 2008; 
Mark et al. 2009; Semaan & Mark 2011). Other studies have investigated how people 
re-appropriate discarded resources, such as, for instance, a power generator in 
response to a large-scale outage caused by a hurricane (Palen et al., 2010b). 
In response to the challenge of dealing with disrupted infrastructures, novel 
systems for emergency communication attempt to leverage alternative communication 
interfaces (such as Bluetooth or Wi Fi radio functionality) to facilitate the construction 
of ad hoc communication links. As people “repurpose, reconfigure, or combine surviving 
portions of pre-existing technology, adopt discarded resources, or share access to still 
working ICT services” (Al-Akkad et al., 2013), new forms of network infrastructure are 
created, which reconnect people and allow them to send and/or receive up to date 
information. However, the design of technologies for emergency response needs to be 
particularly sensitive to the complex contexts in which they are to be used (French and 
Niculae, 2005). Safe use requires new attitudes, regulations and tools that help people 
involved in, or affected by, an emergency to assess which data sources are trustworthy 
and which are not (Palen et al., 2010b). Also, in the light of a continuous stream of 
emerging technologies, a continuous assessment is needed in order to understand 
which systems are appropriate for which information (Reuter et al., 2012). Constraints 
may arise not only in relation to the available technological infrastructures, e.g. in 
terms of what devices are needed to form ad hoc networks, but also with a view to the 
ethical implications of such technology in emergency situations. Many post-disaster 
reviews find that there are serious shortcomings in the ability of the diverse actors 
involved to collaborate and coordinate their efforts. Studies of how systems are 
deployed in the wild, then, can help to shed light on contingencies and consequences of 
novel technologies, and allow us to better understand design implications as well as 
in-situ aspects of technology appropriation. 
In this paper, we study the use of an ad-hoc SOS system for smartphones in the 
context of a large-scale “terrorist attack” scenario. The aim is to further our 
understanding of how technology can support those who need to call for help in 
emergency situations, and how systems supporting SOS calls interact with the 
practices of professional emergency responders. The scenario in question was chosen 
because of the dangers of giving away one’s position in adversarial situations such as 
an ongoing terrorist attack.1 
Our research is part of a long term iterative participatory design process with 
professional practitioners, deploying an enhanced prototype of a system that we have 
developed (Al-Akkad et al., 2014b), which creates short-lived ad-hoc networks between 
neighboring devices. It allows people in disaster situations to broadcast a distress 
 
1 This scenario was purposely designed to echo, in some respects, the awful events of July, 2011 on the 
island of Utøya in Norway (cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Norway_attacks). 
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signal that can be picked up by rescue workers. Moreover, rescue workers may acquire 
further information, such as the GPS location of the sender. In a series of workshops 
and experimental implementations during emergency response training exercises, the 
system was increasingly realistically integrated into practices of responding to 
different emergencies including a fire in a train in a tunnel and a car accident. The 
details of the technical development of the system as well as a mainly technical 
evaluation have been published elsewhere (Al-Akkad et al., 2014b). This paper takes 
a step forward by exploring how the system was used by first responders and students 
acting as victims during a large-scale emergency exercise in Norway, and reflecting 
these experiences against our design rationale as well as the literature on crisis 
response. During the exercise, our system was used by a special unit of the police who 
were searching for persons at the site of the incident. After the exercise, we conducted 
interviews with a police officer and three students who acted as affected people during 
the exercise. We further evaluated the concept in a workshop with practitioners for 
crisis management. 
Our study shows that two aspects are particularly important to make ad-hoc 
communication systems useful in adversarial situations where communication is 
restricted to peer to peer channels and especially sensitive to interception and misuse. 
Firstly, it must be possible to assess the validity of the distress calls in terms of their 
content. Can the calls for help be trusted? For a police unit, key questions are whether 
the information related to this call is truthful (i.e. not a hoax or, worse, a trap) and 
whether it is accurate, as the person’s position may become obsolete. Secondly, there 
are issues around the (in-) visibility of the system’s operation in terms of who is able 
to detect distress calls. For the people sending the distress signals, key questions are 
“has my call been heard?” and “by whom?” Based on an analysis of our findings, we 
explore implications for an enhanced design of mobile SOS systems, highlighting novel 
aspects that are relevant for researchers working in the field of designing support 
systems for emergency response. 
2 RELATED WORK 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) are bringing new kinds of 
transformation. A process of ‘informationalising’ (cf. Liegl et al. 2016) crisis response 
and management is currently underway, following in the footsteps of similar 
developments in other industries and services. In the following sections, we provide an 
overview on related work from designing mobile applications for communication in 
emergency situations, as well as on SOS calls. 
2.1 Supporting Communication in Emergency Situations 
People increasingly rely on technology in their daily routine, but having access to ICT 
services can also be crucial in disaster situations, when it is important to receive and 
send up to date information (Coyle and Meier, 2009; Palen and Liu, 2007). For instance, 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides an application 
(http://1.usa.gov/P8V5sf) that enables people in distress to receive shelter information 
and also to submit images with a short description to the FEMA website, which will be 
placed on a map for public viewing. Another system, SafeCity (http://www.safecity.nl), 
allows the reception of live video streams from mobile devices reporting crimes or other 
distress situations. Professional responders use a dedicated application to stream video 
along with their GPS position to the command center or to other colleagues in the field. 
Users can install a free application called Bambuser (http://www.bambuser.com), 
which enables them to view and stream live video. In order to report any video to 
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authorities, users need to register for specific “shares”, such as “Crime stoppers” or 
“Public Officials”. All these existing emergency response systems represent promising 
tools for communication between the public and authorities or non-governmental 
organizations during a crisis. However, to be of use, any of these systems require the 
network infrastructure to be still operable. At the same time, the reality is that 
availability of ICT services can be severely disrupted in the aftermath of disasters; 
that is, in the very moment when people rely most on communication technology to 
report their emergency needs (Reuter, 2013). These disruptions can result from 
damage to, or congestion in, the preexisting network structure, or large-scale outages.  
Several systems have been developed that attempt to leverage ad-hoc 
communication links for enabling users to exchange emergency messages in situations 
where the existing communication infrastructure has stopped functioning, for instance 
NowForce (http://www.nowforce.com), Zello (http://www.zello.com), Twimight 
(Hossmann et al., 2011) or OpenGarden (Iosifidis et al., 2014), to name just a few. Our 
approach goes into a similar direction, enabling users to broadcast messages via Wi-
Fi. The particular scope of the technology developed is to address disaster situations 
in which people can no longer communicate via everyday services, such as phone calls, 
texting services, messengers or social media, because the underlying network 
infrastructure is disrupted. In such situations, people look for any method of 
connectivity in order to regain their ability to communicate and retrieve information 
about ongoing events during and in the aftermath of a disaster.  
We have provided an extensive review of such existing systems in our previous work 
(Al-Akkad et al., 2014b). Summarizing, one can say that existing systems are often 
hard to deploy because they either require difficult pairing mechanisms (often based 
on Bluetooth) or special hardware / software configurations (such as rooted devices or 
availability of networking standards such as WiFi Direct that are not yet established) 
that makes it impossible to deploy them on standard hardware, strongly limiting their 
practicality. We therefore wanted to create a system that overcomes these limitations, 
allowing people to send SOS messages in situations where the network infrastructure 
has failed, and one that is both easy to use and runs on off-the-shelf devices as well.  
The concept of our SOS system was inspired by how people make use of the names 
of Wi-Fi home networks (SSIDs) to broadcast short messages conveying simple, 
anonymous information. For instance, some SSIDs may express neighbourly requests, 
such as “Turn the noise down” or political ideas as “ILoVeObAma!!”(Al-Akkad et al., 
2014b). A Wi-Fi network is visible within a certain range and the advertised SSID is 
usually the first thing people become aware of in terms of wireless networks. 
Essentially, people can easily find and understand SSID names. They represent an 
interesting point of contact between people. The creation of an emergency beacon 
defines a sort of “Help me” signal, which may help professional first responders to find 
persons (see Figure 1). As default settings in smartphones notify users of the presence 
of detected networks, any person in vicinity searching for connectivity with a 
smartphone may discover the emergency signal.  
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Figure 1: Example of how Wi-Fi SSIDs can be exploited to convey short messages (screenshot, not part of 
our prototype) 
 
Our system enables people in distress to use their phones to communicate their 
situation in the form of an ad-hoc emergency signal that can be received by professional 
first responders, helping them to find both persons in difficulty and respective danger 
zones in disaster situations. To do so, the system leverages established wireless 
network protocols and standards to create ad-hoc communication links between 
wireless devices in proximity. One device, called the “Beacon”, advertises an 
emergency message inside the SSID, i.e. the human readable name of a Wi-Fi network. 
In turn, another device, called the “Seeker”, scans the environment for devices that 
advertise themselves as Beacons and instantiates brief connections to those in order 
to confirm to each Beacon that it has been discovered. In cases where connectivity is 
strong enough, both Beacon and Seeker exchange further information that exceeds the 
32 ASCII characters constraint of the SSID, such as the person’s location or the unique 
ID of a phone (shortly IMEI). The functionality of the system will be presented in more 
detail in section 4.2. 
2.2 Conceptual Approaches Towards SOS Calls 
Previous work in HCI (e.g. Starbird et al., 2010, Starbird and Palen, 2011; Ludwig et 
al., 2013; Reuter et al., 2012) as well as from practitioner-driven organizations such as 
EENA (http://www.eena.org) has investigated socio-technical issues around the 
enhancement of SOS calls by means of ICT (e.g. Bornheim and Fletcher, 2016) as well 
as the organizational and collaborative aspects of emergency response work. Within 
HCI, the literature on SOS calls has been based, to a substantial degree, on 
conversation analysis, a mode of sociological inquiry that proceeds through detailed 
study of talk and interaction. Most studies are concerned with the dialogic nature of 
calling for help and the challenge of the co-construction of meaning between caller and 
responder. Issues that have been discussed include problems responders face in 
retrieving information about the location (where?) and the nature (what?) of the 
incident (Baker et al., 2005), managing information overload and misunderstandings, 
partly due to the anxious state of the caller (Cromdal et al., 2008; Whalen and 
Zimmerman, 1998), the identification of hoax calls, and whether or not to initiate 
dispatch (Bergmann, 1993; Garcia and Parmer, 1999; Whalen and Zimmerman, 1990), 
difficulty in defining a proper form of response based on the information provided by 
the caller, i.e. negotiating the problem of initiating dispatch too early (not enough 
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information), waiting too long, or sending the wrong kinds of resource (Larsen, 2013; 
Paoletti, 2009; Whalen and Zimmerman, 1990). 
Further aspects discussed in this literature are the implications of the technical 
communication infrastructure used for the organization and the sense making 
processes inherent in these calls. The affordances of landline telephones and general 
emergency call numbers such as 911 (US) or 112 (Germany), for example, have an 
impact on the structure of the call in terms of what information has to be provided or 
what can be assumed. Callers calling from landlines, for example, may be unable to 
see the scene, while mobile phone calls can potentially come directly from the incident 
scene. Mobile phone callers often do not know the exact address of where they are, 
hence cannot always provide accurate instructions on the destination of the dispatch. 
At the same time mobile phones enable emergency services to enlist the caller into 
giving more detailed and live observations of the incident, helping them for instance 
to establish the number and condition of affected people in the vicinity, to give a clearer 
impression of the scale of the incident and the amount and kind of resources to dispatch 
(Krishnamoorthy and Agrawala, 2012). While this may allow to better calibrate the 
response it does take additional time, and it can recruit the caller who previously often 
was merely a messenger, into the situation as an “auxiliary member” of the emergency 
services. Moreover, it might make civilians of one kind or another early responders as 
denoted by Palen, Anderson et al. (2010), as such people are often acting on the basis 
of knowledge which is for the time being not available to emergency response 
authorities (Stallings & Quarantelli, 1985; Aguirre et al., 1995; Kendra & Wachtendorf, 
2006). 
In comparison with classic SOS calls (landline to landline), but also mobile 
emergency calls (mobile caller), our approach has some striking differences:  
 
1. Messages are likely to reach professional responders only after they have been 
dispatched and are thus subsequent to distress calls with emergency call center 
operators. They may reach informal first responders, such as other people affected 
by the events or people in the vicinity, sooner. 
2. The system affords new immediacy—a direct, local form of communication which is 
not characterized as a “conversation”, but as a broadcast of a distress signal phrased 
as a statement that the sender makes about the situation at hand, i.e. it misses (or 
there is no need for) the co-construction of information about the incident found in 
distress calls to the call center.  
3. We shift the focus from the classic “dispatch center” to mobile responders who are 
already in the field and able to pick up SOS calls similar to hearing someone calling 
for help vocally, implying a more direct mode of interaction between professional 
first responders and people in the area of a disaster (although by relaying identified 
Beacons to the dispatch center, the incident command can direct first responders to 
areas with overlooked persons).  
4. We augment the distress call with additional information such as location data, 
shifting the mode of delivery from description to a form of auto-address through 
geo-coordinates, which could free time for further contextual information to be 
exchanged. 
 
The immediacy of the communication resonates with emerging practices around the 
increasing use of social media for the assessment of emergency situations (Abel et al., 
2012; Ludwig et al., 2015), which seek to enable real-time analysis of, for instance, 
Tweets from disaster areas. Here, issues of determining the accuracy or quality and 
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accessibility of information have been found to be critical (Linna Li, 2010; Palen et al., 
2010b). To some degree, our system has similar features to social media, but with a 
much more local focus and a smaller scope in comparison.  
Social media are also known to play an important part in the second theme we 
mention, that is, cooperation between first responders and the public in order to deal 
with the contingent needs created by a disaster, which is commonly understood as 
informal response (Hagar and Haythornthwaite, 2005; Palen et al., 2010a). On the one 
hand, a bidirectional flow of information between formal and informal responders can 
be an important resource for first responders in organizing relief efforts (O’Keefe, 2009); 
on the other hand, it empowers people that are affected by a disaster to help 
themselves, challenging the notion of “victims” to some extent (Perng et al., 2013). 
In respect of the way in which SOS calls provide additional information 
automatically, the system delegates the broadcast of information to location aware 
sensing systems. Metadata have been found to play an important role for the 
assessment of information retrieved by social media (Chorley et al., 2015). In 
emergencies, this renders affected people more visible and facilitates visualization on 
a map via location sharing (Gordon and Silva, 2011; Wu et al., 2013). Location sharing 
technologies have become popular, but also contested in social networks such as 
Facebook or Foursquare over recent years, because they allow people to stay in touch 
and monitor the location of friends, to engage in location sensitive mobile gaming 
(Gordon and Silva, 2011; Licoppe, 2004) and more recently location sensitive dating, 
where people willing to date or hook up make themselves discoverable and addressable 
by (nearby) location (Liegl and Stempfhuber, 2014, Beale, 2005; Birnholtz et al., 2014; 
Blackwell et al., 2014). While this kind of technology was already recognized and 
welcomed in the early 2000s (Rheingold, 2007), others exploited the concept of co-
presence, understood as two or more people being in proximity (nearby) at a given time 
for meeting applications (Müller et al., 2013) that provide new and improved 
opportunities for urban, social interaction (Paulos and Goodman, 2004; Sutko and 
Silva, 2011). Other approaches make use of proximity-based affordances to enable 
exploration (Hornecker et al., 2011) or gaming (Falk et al., 2001) (e.g. Ingress by Google 
where local teams cooperatively solve tasks, or the more recent location-based game 
Pokémon GO). Most of these approaches have in common that they try to create 
awareness about opportunities nearby and, due to that opportunistic nature, are 
mostly concerned with providing more comfortable or localized services. 
The changes that we have outlined above have the potential to enhance, but also to 
challenge and disrupt, the practices of professional first responders and people in 
disaster situations. In order to better understand the possible contingencies and 
consequences of deploying technology in practice we have set up an empirical study 
that will be presented and discussed in the following sections. Our point in so doing is 
twofold: Firstly, situated evaluations of this kind get much closer to real-world 
conditions, which are important yet extremely hard to study (cf. Turoff, 2002). 
Secondly, although disasters and emergencies may have some generic features, we also 
need to understand what is specific to a given situation, if new technology is to become 
widely adopted in such circumstances. In our scenario, where the threat comes from 
other people, there is a need to understand how to constrain the availability of 
communications. 
3 APPROACH AND PROTOTYPE 
Our study has been part of a large European research project that strives to support 
professional responders and members of the public by providing means for ad-hoc 
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communication for situations in which existing network infrastructure is disrupted. In 
situations of disrupted infrastructure, finding trapped or hiding persons is one 
important need for first responders. This study builds on prior fieldwork (Al-Akkad et 
al., 2014b, 2013) in which we have evaluated our system during an emergency response 
exercise that took place in an underground tunnel fire scenario. In this previous work, 
we have focused on performing a mainly technical evaluation of how our prototype 
performed in a burning tunnel, a challenging physical environment for our technology. 
The field test was supplemented with interviews where we investigated how the 
practitioners, in this case the fire fighters that were dispatched, dealt with the 
emergency. We will summarize the findings of this scenario in the discussion section, 
comparing it with this study in order to draw out some of the specificities we mention 
above. 
3.1 Methodology 
In the context we design for, it is crucial to explore the feasibility and applicability of 
technology in close-to-real emergency or disaster conditions. Therefore, we tried to 
explore the viability of core features of our system in an early stage of development 
(Edwards et al., 2003). For instance, in our previous study (Al-Akkad et al., 2014b), we 
first conducted a feasibility study of an initial version of our prototype (TRL 4/5) in an 
underground tunnel in which communication was rather difficult or intermittent due 
to the high amount of steel and curves. We identified constraints in terms of 
implementation and revised our prototype, and then were able to evaluate it in the 
context of an emergency exercise that was organized in the same underground tunnel. 
As our system is in a more mature stage by now (TRL 6), we are engaging in ongoing 
evaluations with the technology in increasingly realistic emergency exercises in order 
to get a better understanding of how our solution is used in practice (Wulf et al., 2011). 
From an organizational perspective the goal of introducing a system such as ours 
should be to enhance and support established practices of emergency response. 
Emergency response is a domain with rigid structures (Denef et al., 2011) and a need 
for a combination of agility and discipline (Harrald, 2006). This creates a dynamic 
ecology for the design and implementation of new technologies. Hence, we continuously 
evaluate our design through various qualitative research methods: participant 
observation, one-to-one interviews, workshops, and real world exercises. The 
participants of our evaluations are practitioners of emergency response ranging from 
fire fighters, police officers, paramedics, reconstruction engineers, to experts and 
consultants for crisis management (cf. Liegl et al., 2016). 
Besides practitioners in emergency response teams, our methodology also involves 
people in distress as the other group of end-users, which in the following we will refer 
to as affected people (as opposed to responders or practitioners). This avoids the 
problematic and misleading implications of the term “victim”. Not all people affected 
by disasters are victims, and even if they are, they may not be passively awaiting 
rescue by the professional responders. The image of passive victims runs counter to 
the intention of our SOS system and also to the empirical fact that people affected by 
disasters are in general more resilient, capable, active, altruistic and calm than 
assumed in popular imaginaries, circulating in the media but also amongst first 
responders (Mitchell et al., 2000; Dynes, 1995; Jul, 2007; Quarantelli and Dynes, 1972). 
For this reason, and despite the fact that the term “victim” is an established term in 
the emergency response domain and was frequently used by our practitioner research 
collaborators to describe the users of the SOS technology amongst people affected by 
an emergency in our empirical work, we decided against using it here.  
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It is important to note that collecting input from people affected by disasters is 
complex for both practical and ethical reasons. In order to explore the use of our 
technology from this perspective, we organized interviews and observations with 
students who volunteered to act as affected people in simulated scenarios and exercises, 
thus gathering feedback and identifying limitations of the current state of the 
technology. This is part of an iterative development process, helping us to continuously 
adapt our design and to address more properly the needs of both affected people as well 
as practitioners who participated in the exercise, in our case members of a special unit 
of the police. 
After the exercise we conducted semi structured interviews with both groups of 
users, encouraging them to share any ideas or concerns that came up in their 
experience with using the technology. We interviewed the students on the day directly 
after the exercise; representatives from the police unit were interviewed on phone two 
weeks later. The interviews were conducted by two members of our research group who 
had also attended the exercise. We followed a loose guideline where the participants 
were asked to talk about their experiences during the exercise in general and especially 
their impressions of using our technology. The interviews were recorded with 
permission of the interviewees and transcribed with a focus on the contents of the 
conversation. We then performed a topic based qualitative content analysis of the 
transcripts as well as our field notes from the exercise with a focus on limitations of 
our prototype and lessons learned and especially on anything unexpected.   
3.2 Prototype 
Our system comprises two applications (see Figure 2). The first is an SOS application 
which enables its users to create an emergency beacon by placing short messages 
inside the SSID of a Wi-Fi network. The other application is the corresponding “Seeker” 
that supports professional first responders in discovery of the requesting Beacons. 
Both applications can be deployed on devices running Android (supported APIs range 
from 2.3.3 to 4.x). Android is the most widespread operating system for mobile devices 
and by supporting lower API versions the system can be installed on a wide range of 
devices. As soon as the SOS application is launched, it starts to broadcast a help 
message that users can pick from a pre-defined list or enter themselves (see left image 
in Figure 2).  
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Figure 2: Application for responders (left) and application for affected people (right) 
 
The Seeker (see right image in Figure 2) continuously searches the environment for 
Beacons and filters the scanned Wi-Fi networks based on an uncommon sequence of 
characters (*#%), which is put as a prefix inside the SSID of a Beacon device. When a 
Seeker connects to a Beacon the phone behind the Beacon plays a “beacon-like” sound 
and vibrates briefly. The audio-vibration feedback can help responders to locate 
affected people, depending on the kind of gear they are wearing and how the device is 
carried (e.g. in a pocket, with a strap around the neck, or in hand, Al-Akkad et al., 
2014b).  
When the SOS application is launched, but no locations services are activated yet, 
the application asks the user if s/he would like to enable location services. If the Beacon 
is not able to retrieve a GPS fix, the position of the Seeker is used instead, giving at 
least some rough indication. As indoor GPS is not available and moreover GPS modules 
embedded in smartphones only provide an accuracy of up to 10m, further means for 
positioning people are needed. Currently, the reception of a Wi-Fi signal implies that 
the mobile hotspot is within 60-200m range of the receiving device, depending on the 
environment as well as the strength and configuration of both phones’ antennas. 
Users can update their status messages at any time. In the case when a person 
wants to stop broadcasting an SOS signal (e.g. because they feel safe), users can select 
a specific entry (i.e. “I’m safe”) from the list. Then, the application will place a specific 
suffix in the SSID of the signal that informs the Seeker that this Beacon should no 
longer be considered and marks them accordingly. 
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Figure 3: Integration with established emergency systems 
 
The usefulness of the SOS system can be greatly extended when it is linked to other 
emergency response systems. Figure 3 depicts the big picture in which the presented 
system is operated in the frame of the research project, which develops infrastructural 
support for interoperability and the assembly of systems of systems. Within the 
broader system, the responder application that runs on the Seeker device sends the 
data acquired from Beacons to a command center using a mesh network, which routes 
the data to a publish-subscribe system that pushes the data to a command center. 
There, the personnel can view the Beacons on a map and use the data to coordinate 
response efforts. For instance, incident commanders may be able to roughly gauge 
progress in search and rescue efforts visually, as persons sending a Beacon are being 
found and deactivate their beacons.  
4 FINDINGS 
In this section we describe results from our ongoing evaluation of the prototype and 
the socio-technical innovations arising around it in the project. In particular, we will 
present findings from a field evaluation of our prototype in a real world exercise 
(sections 5.1 and 5.2). In the second part (Sections 5.3 and 5.4), we describe the 
feedback on our prototype received from students and a member of a special police unit. 
Finally, in section 5.5, we illustrate aspects raised in a workshop with a group of 
experts.  
4.1 Real World Exercise Simulating a Terrorist Attack 
We had the opportunity to participate in a large-scale exercise that took place at the 
port of a Norwegian city with a high concentration of industries for petrol and gas. The 
overall goal of the exercise was to train inter-agency collaboration between the three 
main response units (police, fire brigade, and ambulance). Planned in the aftermath of 
the 2011 Norway attacks (Perng et al., 2013) and in relation to local risks and the 
potential for man-made disasters in the industrial area at the port, the exercise 
simulated a scenario in which a group of armed criminals entered the area through the 
ferry port with the aim of attacking a chemical factory located next to it. The exercise 
scenario was labeled a terrorist attack. As the attackers proceeded through the ferry-
boat and the ferry terminal, they shot, injured and killed a large number of people.  
Figure 4 shows a layout of the incident site. After discussing with the exercise 
committee of the exercise, we chose the ferry as our main site for the evaluation of the 
SOS system. As users of our system, we chose a special police unit that would have to 
search for affected people and attackers on the area, and that would also enter the 
ferry at some point. The officers were introduced to our system a day before the exercise, 
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but did not have any details about the planned exercise—neither the kind of incident, 
nor the area. Furthermore, the exercise committee allowed us to equip three students 
(V1, V2, and V3) on board of the ferry with smartphones. Before the exercise, the 
training exercise supervisors gave instructions to the students to act as affected 
passengers during the exercise, and to play their role as realistically as possible in the 
sense of doing what felt natural to them in such a situation. 
  
Figure 4: Disaster zone of the large-scale exercise 
 
To explore how the amount of steel inside the ferry might weaken the signals and 
impact the functionality of our technology, we conducted several test runs on the ferry 
a few days before the large-scale exercise took place. Figure 5 shows one researcher 
searching for signals and V1 hiding behind the door of one cabin. In the beginning, the 
students kept the sound feature of the SOS application turned on, making it quite easy 
to locate them. Then, the students switched the sound off, reasoning that it could also 
make the attackers in the exercise aware of their location and put them in danger. As 
the ferry was a quite familiar place for the students, they found hiding places quite 
easily and we had great difficulties to locate them when receiving no additional 
information. GPS would not work inside the ferry. Thus, acting from necessity one 
researcher looked into the Android Wi-Fi settings, which indicate the signal strength 
for each detected Wi-Fi network, and in this way could help to locate the hiding 
students.  
 
Managing Visibility and Validity of Distress Calls                                                                                      39:13 
                                                                                                                                         
 
ACM Transactions on xxxxxxxx, Vol. xx, No. xx, Article xx, Publication date: Month YYYY 
 
Figure 5: Search for signals and V1 hiding in a cabin 
 
The responder application was enhanced to display the signal strength (see above 
Figure 2 yellow bar of first two entries in the responder application). The orange scale 
depicted in the responder application depicts the signal strength of the tracked 
Beacons. This signal strength bar shows the received signal more precisely than the 
Android Wi-Fi settings, which only highlights or shades the four semicircles of the Wi-
Fi logo. The responder application maps the received signal to a scale from 1 to 20, 
whereby 20 is the highest value. It provides a finer granularity. When no signal is 
received for a Beacon, the signal strength bar disappears from the user interface.  
Having enhanced the system with some means for indoor localization, our system 
was ready to be deployed in the large-scale exercise. We left five smartphones with the 
three students—two additional ones as backup—to be used during the exercise, and 
we met with them one day after the exercise to discuss their experience of the system 
and conduct semi-structured interviews. 
4.2 Overall Response Operation 
The SOS systems played a small but significant role in the overall response operation. 
The responder application in Figure 2 depicts distress signals that were configured by 
the three affected people during the exercise and the Seeker phone that discovered 
those signals.  
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Figure 6: Special police unit entering the ferry 
 
At an early point during the exercise a special police unit was formed ‘on the hoof’(see 
Figure 6), which entered the ferry, following a report that at least one terrorist had 
been seen on the ferry. This special police unit discovered V1, who was hiding on the 




Figure 7: V2 hiding under stairs (top) and V3 behind a barrier (bottom). 
 
The remaining two affected persons hiding from the attackers (V2 and V3 in Figure 7) 
were later discovered using our system with the responder application “sniffing” for 
the presence of Beacons. One user device was able to retrieve a GPS fix. The two other 
Beacons were mapped to the GPS position of the responder device at the time it 
discovered these two Beacons. The data from Beacons were forwarded to an 
operational control room where their locations were visualized on map by means of 
their (precise or approximated) GPS positions.  
4.3 Feedback from the Students 
Overall, the students reported that they experienced the exercise itself as highly 
realistic. Even though they knew everything was just a simulation, they had to wait 
for a long time in their hideouts until the police units found them. In this regard, the 
general possibility of having access to an SOS system was very positive for them, as it 
made them feel less alone in the situation. At the same time, they had a mixed 
experience of the system, as it became clear to us in the following interviews. For 
instance, V2 pointed out that the SOS application could be misused to play a joke on 
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the emergency personnel. Aligned to this, V3 explained that initially—after playing 
“hide and seek”—she liked the idea of leveraging the ubiquity of Wi-Fi SSIDs to convey 
emergency needs. However, she then realized that that very ubiquity could spell 
danger and became concerned that the attackers would detect her messages, too:  
V3: If I had run wild in the woods the app would be great, but it is not 
good in case of a terroristic attack.  
This was also a more general concern mentioned by all three students. The 
dissemination of data to untrusted people was seen as a flaw. Their desire would be 
that only the police or trusted response units would be able to pick up their messages 
in such kinds of emergency scenarios. Also, V3 pointed out that she would like the 
Seeker device to connect to her phone, when she set up her status to “safe” in order to 
know that the personnel in the field and in the control room had become aware of her 
new state. At the same time, the students would have liked to have some kind of 
feedback about the status of the rescue operations.  
With regard to the distribution of the application, both V1 and V2 could imagine 
obtaining the application in a decentralized way (Al-Akkad et al., 2014a), in case 
Internet connection was disrupted. Even so, they would prefer to have the application 
preinstalled.  
V1: I propose to have it shipped in every phone, already when you buy 
it. 
Not least, V2 expressed the difficulty of designing interactions for each context.  
V2: The area was dark; when I was using the app it would light up the 
area. So if the terrorists were near they would see the light. 
Other aspects that were mentioned by the interviewees related to the limited size 
of the messages that would require some creativity and may be too limited in more 
complex situations. Another proposal made by V2 was to take pictures and add 
keywords and then send this data out when exchanging details between the Beacon 
and the Seeker device. 
4.4 Feedback from Members of Special Police Unit 
During the exercise, a special unit of the police was deployed to look for terrorists and 
affected people. At some point this team entered the ferry accompanied by one of the 
authors who was able to observe the rescue mission and assist in the handling of the 
Seeker device. Two weeks after the exercise, we organized a semi-structured interview 
with one police officers of the special unit who interacted with our system while being 
assisted from one of the authors. 
The police officer (PO) explained that their main mission was to chase the terrorists, 
and at the same time take care of the health personnel entering safe areas in order to 
do their job. PO explained that during the operation his team and he experienced a lot 
of problems with the radio, i.e. the walkie-talkie system used by the police. This 
hampered the communication between response personnel in the field and the incident 
commander. Initially, the special police unit did not go on the ferry as some smoke was 
coming out. Though, after several unsuccessful attempts to contact the fire brigade the 
special police unit decided to go onto the ferry despite the absence of any “green light” 
confirmed by the fire brigade. 
PO: After a while we tried to get hold to somebody of the fire 
department, because we wanted to be told what kind of smoke is 
coming from the boat before we went in. So, we have the correct 
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equipment immediately to go in. We waited like 5-10 minutes, which 
felt in this situation like years. Finally we couldn't wait anymore, and 
as we understood there are problems with the radio, we went in to the 
boat. It was our own decision, as we saw the smoke decreasing, we saw 
our chance to get inside the ferry.  
As the radio was not working, the leader standing outside near to the ferry could 
not instruct them, as he would have liked to. In response to this, for example, the 
special police unit tried to go for sounds and also talking to affected people or other 
witnesses who had seen any of the terrorists. 
At the same time the PO made clear that locating people was not the highest 
priority in the beginning of their mission, but later in the progress of the operation it 
became more important.  
PO: First of all we had to locate the terrorist to avoid any further harm. 
That was a big challenge, as while we were searching for the terrorists, 
we encountered a lot of injured and shocked people. 
Further, the PO made clear that during the beginning of a mission he and his 
colleagues normally have their hands full and cannot use additional devices such as 
our Seeker device.  
PO: I had my private phone with me but I didn't use it. Our mission 
does not allow us to use phones [...] but if things calm down we might 
have one hand free. 
However, the practitioners acknowledged that the leader of the operation could 
maybe handle the device. 
PO: The leader should not use both hands for weapons. So he has one 
hand free, which he could work with more than one device and provide 
information to us and to the other members outside.  
At the same time, the PO said that our technology could also be useful for 
supporting the communication between the police officers in case the radio is not 
working, as it happened during the exercise. 
PO: Good backup plan if the radio is not working, so we could listen 
whatever is going on from our commanders [...] that could go through 
our personal phone. 
Reflecting on the question if it would be dangerous for affected people to advertise 
their help messages via a Wi-Fi SSID names, the PO had some concerns that the 
messages could be picked up by terrorists.  
PO: I mostly agree that terrorists would get this information as well 
[...] people send information to police that they need help and where 
they are [...] it might be possible to check out who is sending the 
message [...] depending on how many people are there.  
When we discussed with the PO the possibility of reverting the setup, i.e. a 
responder would broadcast a signal that affected people could track by their phones, 
the PO agreed that it might be a preferable option in comparison to the current setup: 
PO: Maybe it is better that we, as the police, send out the signal in 
order to help the people around us and tell them where they can meet 
us. If in worst case the terrorists can see us, we are somehow ready to 
cope with them as well. Maybe we have a description of them. Instead 
of the terrorist can sort of see where victims are hiding [...] I think it 
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would be very interesting to try out the other way around, I guess this 
could be helpful. 
4.5 Workshop with Domain Experts 
In addition to evaluating our system as part of the exercise, we organized a workshop 
with five practitioners for crisis management who were invited to attend the exercise 
as observers:  
 
• A head of the ambulance service (AS),  
• An officer of a European federal police (FP),  
• An inspector at a police college (PC),  
• A head of division for civil protection (CP), and  
• An industrial manufacturer (IM).  
 
The workshop was organized on the day before the exercise and took place on the 
same site during the preparations. First, the practitioners were briefed on the plans 
for the exercise. Then, we had the opportunity to present our technology against this 
background, and discuss with them how it would be used during the day of the exercise. 
The workshop mainly consisted of presentations and group discussions, which were 
audio recorded for later analysis, but the participants also had the opportunity to 
attend the preparations of the exercise and see demonstrations of our prototypes. The 
overall goal of the workshop was to receive multiple high-level perspectives from 
different crisis stakeholders on the applicability and possible implications of using our 
system in the emergency response domain, also sensitizing us for the field work on the 
following day. 
At first the practitioners confirmed the trend towards equipping field personnel 
with wireless devices as smartphones or tablet computers. Then, the head of civil 
protection (CP) made the request to investigate into possibilities to use voice channels 
in order to confirm to people that their signal has been picked up. He critically pointed 
out the practice of receiving a text-based confirmation without talking to personnel.  
CP: This would frustrate people. It’s like receiving a number when you 
are waiting in the queue of a hotline, where you know it will take time 
to talk to somebody [...] I suggest to enhance your system for the 
possibility of sending short voice messages. 
We also confronted the practitioners regarding an inverted setup. In this context, 
the police college inspector (PC) voiced concerns about the possibility of a terrorist 
obtaining a responder device and stressed that this would present a risk.  
PC: “Let’s say you secure the device the responder is supposed to carry 
[...] I am afraid that people would still be able to hack it and gain access. 
Then, your system would become even counter productive.” 
The federal police officer (FP) supported this by giving an example of a sniper in 
Norway who called the police pretending to be asking for help, thus setting up a trap 
in which two police officers were fatally injured. In response, the head of civil 
protection (CP) made a suggestion to use an inverted setup of our system.  
CP: Responders who carry devices that broadcast a sort of “we are in 
here and we are trying to get through to you”. I guess that makes more 
sense. It is similar to current practices of fire fighters […] when 
responders enter a house they talk to the persons inside the house in 
order to get relevant information from the people. 
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There were also other ideas for possible improvements made during the workshop. 
For instance, the head of ambulance (AS) brought up the aspect of civilian-to-civilian 
communication. Although this idea conflicts with the risk that a person broadcasting 
a Beacon may actually be a terrorist, he justified his opinion by explaining that, for 
other scenarios, a civilian-to-civilian communication would be helpful. For instance, in 
the aftermath of a flooding or an earthquake, volunteers or local residents could use 
our technology supporting them while trying to help affected people. 
The industrial manufacturer (IM) further proposed to link the responder 
application via the GPS feature with a map-based application that also works in an 
off-line modus by caching GPS positions. Having this in place, the IM explained the 
use case of a responder independently looking for affected people in the vicinity without 
having received instructions from the incident commander. 
Finally, the federal police officer (FP) underlined the limitation of relying on 
location changes being only visible through the Wi Fi SSID.  
FP: What happens if a victim moves elsewhere? I mean assume his 
position would change significantly its position. Then the location that 
you have obtained earlier when connecting to a victim’s phone would 
become obsolete.  
5 DISCUSSION 
The evaluation allowed us to gain insights into the usefulness our system in the 
practice of emergency response in the specific context of a simulated terrorist attack. 
As we have seen, the visibility and validity of help messages were the most important 
concern for the participants of our study. In this section, we further discuss our 
findings with regard to these aspects and suggest design responses to address them 
within the scope of our solution. We also explore some more general implications for 
the design of ethically-aware SOS systems in general. 
In our previous study, we received positive feedback regarding our prototype, it 
being deemed to be useful during emergency response operations in such constrained 
environments as the tunnel fire that we investigated, especially for later phases of the 
emergency operations where the immediate danger of the fire would be under control 
and other tasks such as finding affected persons more important (Al-Akkad et al., 
2014b). Even in the tunnel fire scenario, however, it became clear that responders were 
dealing with a multitude of sometimes conflicting aims and shifting priorities, and that 
designing our solution for such practices did not only require providing a usable, 
technically working solution, but also to better understand the needs and constraints 
of emergency response practice in which context our solution was meant to be used. 
5.1 Managing (In-)visibility of Distress Calls 
The strategy of exposing the presence of an affected person through a Beacon is useful 
for disaster scenarios such as natural or industrial disasters, where it is hard to 
conceive of situations where exposing their presence would put a person at risk (Al-
Akkad et al., 2014b). In the large-scale terrorist attack scenario, however, it turned 
out to be problematic, as users expressed the concern that their freely broadcast 
distress signals could alert the terrorists to locate and harm them. In the post-exercise 
interviews both affected people and responders voiced concerns about potentially 
disclosing their location to the terrorists. In a shooting or a terrorist attack, any 
perpetrator using a phone with Wi-Fi capability could retrieve the Beacon information 
on the presence, and potentially even descriptions of the locations of affected people, 
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as the default settings of their phone would notify them of any discovered Wi-Fi 
network in range.  
Within the context of terror attacks, privacy issues in nearby networks gains much 
greater importance than in other use cases. Privacy based on proximity such as 
described by Toch & Levi (2013) fail because they fall short of granting access only to 
a subset of users within a given radius. Yet, in situations with strongly limited 
infrastructures, it is challenging to provide a technological solution that still scales as 
easily as the HelpBeacons prototype on the one hand and on the other is powerful and 
flexible enough to allow management of visibility and security.  
Thus, from our perspective, the need to manage the visibility of the beacons in a 
better way involves making it clearer to users that, depending on the situation, using 
the app in this particular way could potentially put them in danger. On the positive 
side, users were quite aware of this aspect in our study, so it could be enough to offer 
the possibility of entering a “silent” mode of the distress application which would either 
remain completely silent, only scanning for other beacons, or convey less information 
about the location of the user. Moreover, as the police seemed to be less concerned 
about broadcasting their location, we are now working on an inverted setup of our 
system, i.e. a responder would carry a device that broadcasts a “I’m a responder that 
is here to help you” message of sorts, which in turn people carrying devices in Wi-Fi 
scan mode would be able to discover and connect to in order to notify the responder 
device of their presence (as a side effect, this would also save battery power on phones 
carried by affected people). Such a setup would be more suitable in situations in which 
the user behind a Beacon could get in danger by broadcasting his/her position, and 
decides to hide instead of calling for help, and it would offer additional possibilities for 
improving the security of the handshake between the devices (for instance by using 
fixed SSIDs for the seeker or certificates for authentication).  
In situations where the police might also be concerned about giving away their 
position, the broadcasting device and/or the Seeker could also be attached to an 
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), if the area of operation allows it. This approach would 
be useful, in particular for adversarial situations in which it is dangerous for 
responders to approach an impact zone, or where they need to cover a wide area. 
Tracking Wi-Fi phones via UAVs has already been investigated by some research 
(Wang et al., 2013; Yanmaz, 2012), and seems to be a promising approach to explore. 
We think this approach could help significantly to increase the scalability of our system, 
besides the implementation of an inverted setup. Also, such an approach might support 
the discovery and rescue of affected people who are not able to set up a distress signal, 
but are nevertheless near to tracked signals. 
Regarding the requests for getting an answer to the SOS signal, our system so far 
only supports a very preliminary function of sending an automated response to users 
when their signal has been picked up by the Seeker. This gives users at least a very 
basic feedback when their message has been received. However, our findings show a 
need for support for richer engagement, because people in distress would want to have 
human contact rather than getting an automated “answering machine” style message 
(for example, people in distress want to know when help will be coming, or what to do 
until then). It would, therefore, be interesting to extend the capabilities of our system 
towards a more dialogic way of communication, allowing for example the field 
operators or incident commanders to record situation-specific answers to help calls 
which are conveyed as soon as the system gets a connection again. However, due to the 
resource limitations of our approach as well as the contingencies of emergency 
situation it remains a question for further research. Additional technical design 
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concepts may be needed as well as changes in social and organizational practices and 
structures in order to bring such tools into practice. The informal response capabilities 
of our system could be enhanced by such functionality, allowing – where visibility is 
not a problem – other users in the vicinity of a person in distress to pick up a signal 
and communicate, supporting affected people in helping each other, potentially prior 
to or alongside the involvement of professional responders. 
5.2 Assessing Validity of Data 
The validity of distress calls was another identified limitation of our system, one 
previously unconsidered in our earlier study, where such possibilities would be hardly 
conceivable. Practitioners pointed out situations where attackers might pretend to be 
responders by using a stolen Seeker device. While the benefit of our system unfolds 
through the ubiquity of Wi-Fi SSIDs, at the same time our technology can be misused 
to set up malign messages. Given the terrorist attack scenario, a terrorist could have 
set up a deceptive message and harmed responders lured into trusting the distress 
signal. Of course, such misuse of the system mirrors known threats such as hoax calls 
or misusing the police radio channel (Bergmann, 1993; Garcia and Parmer, 1999; 
Whalen and Zimmerman, 1990). As a police officer, entering a situation with violent 
criminals is always dangerous, and the police would never simply trust the messages 
they receive during such an incident. However, having to take the decision whether or 
not to enter a certain area, the validity of the received messages both in terms of 
content and additional data (such as location information) was definitely a concern for 
the police officers in our study. Given the events that can arise in the course of a 
disaster—the location of a person might change or their state of health might 
deteriorate—it is not always possible to assess whether the received information, even 
when truthfully entered, is still up to date.  
Preventing fake or untruthful messages in a system that is deliberately as open and 
simple as ours poses great challenges and brings new disadvantages. From our 
perspective, automatic identification of fake messages is hardly possible, as we cannot 
control which users install the application and what they do with them. It is thus up 
to the responders in the field or in the command center to interpret the information 
they receive via the system. Similar to the problem described for the visibility of the 
messages, we believe that adding a feedback channel could have some positive effects 
here, as it would allow police officers to initiate at least a simple dialog with the users 
behind a Beacon. However, the high stress level and the multitude of tasks that 
characterize emergency response operations (Al-Akkad et al., 2014b) would make it 
difficult for practitioners to employ substantial resources to checking yet another 
interactive response channel to detect hoaxes or malign messages.  
From a response point of view, the validity of the distress signals in terms of being 
“up-to-date” is much more important. As pointed out by the practitioners, distress calls 
might change over the course of the response operation and require changes in the 
logistics of response efforts. To complicate the process of setting up a message would 
decrease the simplicity of our system making its usage less attractive. However, it 
would be possible to follow a layered approach here, where users can select additional 
functionalities if they so desire, while keeping the very simple “just push a button to 
send SOS” approach intact. In addition, it would be possible to prompt the user for a 
status update every once in a while, either based on a predefined interval (every 30 
minutes) or based on changes the app would be able to detect automatically (such as 
when the GPS position changes, or the signal gets lost).  
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In the future, we could enhance our system to automatically indicate to a Seeker 
that the state of a Beacon, for e.g. the GPS position, has changed. For doing so, the 
Beacon app could monitor its state and indicate changes with a special byte in the 
broadcasted SSID. The Seeker could then re-connect to such marked beacons and 
update the information accordingly. Of course, this approach would reduce the space 
reserved for the help message by a further ASCII-character. To recognize that the state 
of a Beacon has changed could also be dealt with at the site of the Seeker by two 
strategies: When tracking more than once the same Beacon, the Seeker could compare 
the location of the Beacon with the location the Seeker had when it tracked the Beacon 
for the first time, or after a certain time interval the cached list of Beacons could be 
refreshed, then the Seeker would track and connect to the Beacons as if the Seeker had 
not previously encountered the Beacons. 
5.3 General Ethical Deliberations 
Introducing new technology into the organization of response can have disruptive 
effects. Ellebrecht and Kaufmann (2014), for instance, document how in a trial of e-
triage technology, intended to speed up the triage process in German ambulance 
service, the primary effect was the introduction of a formal triage algorithm. They find 
that, in terms of time savings, the system responds to – and drives and further 
legitimizes – currently contested changes in the organization of triage in German 
emergency response organizations. There are two elements. Firstly, in Germany, mass 
casualty incident triage was traditionally carried out by physicians and documented 
by paramedics. This is a costly, labor intensive and relatively slow practice with high 
quality standards. The e-triage system they discuss supports paramedic triage, that is, 
a shift of responsibility from emergency physicians to (cheaper and more numerous) 
paramedics, who can be prompted or strictly guided by a “simple triage and rapid 
treatment” protocol (START) captured in the algorithm that takes the paramedic 
through a series of diagnostic steps. By highlighting a series of ambiguities arising in 
the co-constitution of technology and society, Ellebrecht and Kaufmann’s study 
sensitizes the reader to the entanglement of social practice, societal values and 
technological potential.  
In the case of our technology which provides information on victims and their 
locations, this tool might be used to organize and direct the allocation of help and the 
dispatch of teams, which could disrupt established ways of organizing response, 
similarly leading to potential ethical implications. For example, today, it is common 
practice for first responders to organize the search for affected people based on a grid 
pattern, where one sector after another is cleared by the responders operating in the 
field. Sticking to the pattern, the first responders might even ignore calls for help from 
other sectors on purpose. This procedure has several ethical implications: on the one 
hand, ensures that there is no preference in the order in which affected persons are 
rescued, implying a certain kind of fairness in the response, and it tries to avoid that 
anybody is overlooked. On the other hand, there is the chance that precious time is 
wasted while searching the “wrong” sectors first; especially in time critical missions 
where there might be many wounded people, an argument could be made for changing 
the prioritization of the response efforts to sectors with the most (or most severely) 
wounded.  
Our system certainly has the possibility to affect such practices, as it allows 
identifying distress calls in an automatic way, and visualizing them on a map in the 
incident command center. However, this does have strong ethical implications, as it 
could discriminate against people who have no means to 
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they simply don’t have a smartphone, the battery is drained, or when they are unable 
to use the application because of a wound or because they are unconscious). In addition, 
the availability of such a system might put pressure on the response agencies, making 
it hard for them to justify why a certain person wasn’t rescued, despite the fact that 
they and their situation were known (Büscher et al., 2014). Hence, while the additional 
information that can be gathered with such an SOS system is of course of potential 
interest for first responders, there is a need for caution towards the potential ethical 
implications of the introduction of such a system, and a need for a careful negotiation 
of priorities in the organization of response. Potentially there will also be the need to 
find new (ethical) justifications. 
This finding is related to a more conceptual layer of emergency response work, 
namely the question how logistical decisions of the rescue operations affect ethical 
issues such as fairness and humanity (in terms of who has better chances to be rescued 
first). We would argue that such ethical implications can likely not be fully covered 
and/or prevented by the technical design of systems; due to the complex and often 
contradictory nature of socio-technical innovations, especially in domains with such 
high stakes as emergency response, we would argue that it is rather necessary to make 
such implications explicit and cover them in the co-design process right from the 
start—similar to the improvisational and situated models of change management that 
researchers have recommended for technology design in general (Orlikowski and 
Hofman, 2009). It would hence be important to find ways to react to such deeper 
consequences of new technologies for the practice of emergency responders, and enable 
different stakeholders (such as practitioners, but also civil representatives, lawyers, 
and politicians) to participate in a way that allows for the discussion of possible 
implications on a higher level than on the specifics of particular details of design 
decisions and technical solutions. This requires novel approaches to co-design which 
demonstrate an ethical awareness in the sense that they go beyond the focus on 
changing practices from a merely “operative” perspective towards a greater societal 
and ethical background (Liegl et al., 2015; Liegl et al., 2016; Pereira and Baranauskas, 
2015). 
6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have presented a study on the use of a lightweight SOS system for 
smartphones in the evaluation context of a large-scale terrorist attack exercise. 
Studying the deployment of our system in a different scenario and with a different 
conceptual basis and focusing on the dialogic and local nature of distress calls allowed 
us to identify unforeseen contingencies and subtleties in the practices we are aiming 
to support. This added a new context dimension to our work, and allowed us to refine 
our design and add to the discussion on the practicality of ad-hoc communication 
systems in crisis informatics (e.g. Hagar and Haythornthwaite, 2005b; Palen and Liu, 
2007). It further, and of equal importance, demonstrated the importance of 
understanding the specificities of emergency and/or disaster response as well as their 
more general features. 
Arguably, based on our empirical work the forms network infrastructure may take 
in emergencies can be projected by two contingent dimensions (see Figure 8): the grade 
of the availability of network infrastructure (i.e. whether mobile services are available 
or not), and the degree of sensitivity of the communication (i.e. between people in 
distress and the police). 
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Figure 8: Different emergency scenarios based on the availability of networking and the sensitivity of 
communication. 
 
Much work within the field of crisis informatics (Ludwig et al.,2015; Reuter et al., 2013; 
Palen et al., 2007) has dealt with the means of emergency response by using existing 
infrastructures and crowdsourced information (Case I). The tendency of 
infrastructures to break down in emergency situations motivated us to develop our 
prototype on a backdrop of potential lack of infrastructure and infrastructural 
breakdown (Case II). In our prior work, we intended to provide a means to enable 
untargeted, ad hoc solutions to request help and ease the rescue process (Al-Akkad et 
al., 2014a,b). Yet deploying and testing our prototype in the context of terror attacks 
revealed new design challenges, which dealt with the sensitivity of information, the 
ability to control overall visibility and the management of the target audience (Case 
III). For this case, existing solutions appear not to work too well, as the sensitivity of 
communication challenges existing peer to peer approaches. Likewise, approaches that 
have been investigated in the context of social media analysis which, to some extent, 
can lead to similar deliberations regarding the “accuracy” of the received information 
(Linna Li, 2010; Palen et al., 2010b) are hard to leverage for our SOS system because 
of the much smaller and more localized scope. 
To address these issues, we were able to conceptualize new solutions based on our 
empirical findings for managing the validity (in terms of “is the received information 
truthful and up-to-date”) as well as the visibility (in terms of “who can see my SOS 
signal, if at all”) of SOS messages. Further possible augmentations entailed the idea 
of inverting the roles of sender and receiver (to avoid having people broadcasting their 
location) and/or placing the seeker device on a UAV. Such features could be even 
further augmented in Case IV scenarios where the communication network is at least 
partially restored (e.g. by the emergency responders rolling out their own networks), 
allowing to exchange more data or open additional communication channels to control 
the visibility of information and assess the authenticity of the recipient. Combining 
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centralized approaches and our concept would allow us to address remaining 
limitations that are inherent to peer to peer protocols by augmenting our tool with 
location-based services (cf. Gordon and Silva, 2011; Wu et al., 2013). Here, the 
challenge would be to extend and adapt existing approaches where co-location is used 
mainly to enhance interaction and information exchange (Stein et al., n.d.; Toch and 
Levi 2013), without taking care of the potentially life-threatening implications of 
giving away ones location in adversarial situations as the one we studied. 
Apart of opening a new area for design, our study also has general implications for 
the design of ad hoc SOS systems. While most emergencies will not be identical in 
character to the one we describe, it is our contention that the understanding of a 
variety of scenarios is important in determining the degree to which generic 
approaches to ‘help’ in disaster conditions might be valid. Our findings underline that 
the attempt to simplify distress calls by exchanging the “classic” dialogic nature of 
calling a help line with the broadcasting of simple statements might, whilst useful, 
also come with certain problems. Depending on the nature of the incident, people may 
alternatively hide or shout for help, and situations might be easily too complex to be 
described in a single, brief statement (this implies further challenges for the design of 
interfaces that are usable in life-threatening situations). Furthermore, discussions 
with the experts during the workshop as well as the general deliberations of the 
students and responders in our study revealed some interesting aspects: that despite 
the rather “local” nature of the technology—which could be interpreted as being very 
close to vocal calls for help—and the additional contextual information that is 
exchanged by the tool in terms of GPS location and “safe/unsafe”, status information 
is not always sufficient. Also, even in non-threatening situations, the users wanted to 
have more information about whether their SOS signal would have been picked up, 
and by whom. Hence, our findings also have implications for disaster situations in 
general (i.e. even when sensitivity and connectivity don’t pose issues). Especially, with 
regard to the informal response capabilities that allow people in the vicinity of a 
disaster to cooperate (see Palen et al., 2010a), and with regard to more general ethical 
deliberations of emergency response (cf. Liegl et al. 2015; Liegl et al. 2016). 
Our previous study (Al-Akkad et al. 2014b) and the one we present here underline 
the importance of exploring emergency support systems in situations that are as 
realistic as possible and ensuring that the situations in question encompass different 
conditions. In this case, the importance of ‘sensitivity’ that is introduced by the 
adversarial nature of the situation is paramount. Approaches such as the one we 
detailed help us identify subtle and sometimes unintended side effects and 
contingencies that can affect the appropriation of such tools in practice. Having said 
that, we want to initiate the discourse on what issues should be taken into account 
when designing technology relevant for security. Our study highlights in particular 
two needs, i.e. a) being able to configure or (semi-) automate the visibility of distress 
calls and b) seeking for ways that validate or at least strengthen the credibility of 
distress calls. In order to confirm that tools as the presented one are applicable for the 
broad range of emergency situations, further studies need to inform the community of 
which aspects/issues need to be taken into account in order to ensure a wide 
practicality/utility of such tools. 
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